Second Scientist Speaks Out for Continuing His Research on Deadly Bird Flu Virus
Posted: under Current Affairs, Health, Medicine, and Healthcare.
Tags: Anthony Fauci, biological weapons, biosecurity, bird flu, disease lethality, H5N1 viruses, influenza, mutations, NSABB, pandemics, pathogens, restrictions on research, Richard Ebright, Ron Fouchier, scientific censorship, viral strains, virological research, WHO conference, Yoshihiro Kawaoka
The second of two virologists who created potentially deadly forms of H5N1 (bird flu) viruses spoke out yesterday, a month after the first scientist to disclose his work sparked a heated controversy over the safety of the research. Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the University of Tokyo argued in a commentary in Nature magazine that research on H5N1 pathogens should move forward, since the viruses “circulating in nature already pose a threat, because influenza viruses mutate constantly and can cause pandemics with great losses of life.”
The investigations conducted at Kawaoka’s laboratory and that of Ron Fouchier, who did similar work at Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands, demonstrated that the viruses could evolve into strains that are highly lethal and easily transmissible from person to person. In their laboratories, scientists manipulated the genes of the viruses, creating strains that have the potential to spread through the air in droplets emitted in coughs and sneezes. The research is important for “pandemic preparedness,” Kawaoka went on to say, and “there is an urgent need to expand development, production and distribution of vaccines against H5 viruses.”
The H5N1 form made by Fouchier may be especially lethal, since it is derived from one that had circulated among humans and caused severe disease that killed half of about 600 people who caught it. Last month, while Fouchier’s research paper was under review at Science magazine, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity asked that journal and Nature to refrain from publishing the articles by Fourchier and Kawaoka as they were originally written, and instead omit crucial methodological details describing the creation of the strains.
A highly public debate ensued. Some scientists and experts believed that the research or its publication should be curtailed. Richard Ebright, a bioweapons expert at Rutgers said, “This research should not have been done.” But proponents of the research, including Fouchier and Kawaoka, said that continuing to investigate the nature of the viral threat would pose less danger than stopping it, since it is probable that the deadly strain of virus would evolve naturally or be created in some laboratory as a weapon.
For the time being, Fouchier and Kawaoka have agreed to temporarily interrupt their work. Science and Nature intend to publish only abridged versions of the papers. Next month, a WHO-sponsored international conference in Geneva will provide a forum to discuss the thorny issue of how to allow vital research on disease-causing germs to proceed, while at the same time protecting the public against the potential for pathogens to escape and spread widely.
One of the attendees, Anthony Fauci, who directs NIAID, the infectious disease institute of NIH, said the meeting would “address some of these difficult issues on an international scale instead of something restricted to the United States government.” Although he supports continuing the research, Fauci urged the scientists involved in it to agree voluntarily to the moratorium. “I think we need to get greater input on the conditions in which it goes forward,” he said.
Last month, in a blog posting on the H5N1 research, I referred to the findings on methods of creating the deadly strains. I wrote that it “will require careful supervision of the information and its release only to competent and trustworthy scientists.” That still seems the best course of action. The scientists who think this information should be as widely published and freely available as biological research usually is apparently believe it is pointless and counterproductive to take any precautions. As a member of the scientifically literate public, I am not prepared to assume that they are right.
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Jan 26 2012