Con artists and conjurers have duped gullible folks since the dawn of history, but financial wizards at Goldman Sachs pulled off an amazing transformation—turning huge potential losses into gains—by cheating their own investors, if allegations by the government and reports in the press are true.
Not since the Enron debacle have I been so fascinated by the intricacies of arcane financial transactions. After hours this weekend puzzling out the workings of Goldman operations, I post here my take on the details of the apparent deception. I’m less interested in which individuals did what than how they did it. I acknowledge I’m no financial expert, and what follows includes a lot of my guesswork. But I draw my inferences from several articles appearing in the NY Times and Bloomberg News in recent days.
What went on at Goldman before the housing market crashed?
Until then, house prices were soaring. Like other banks and investment firms, Goldman was accumulating securities called CDOs, formed from bundles of risky subprime mortgages. The securities were paying high rates of return.
What went wrong with Goldman’s strategy?
If many homeowners providing the income stream to the holders of CDOs defaulted in large numbers, then Goldman (and other institutions) might suffer huge losses and bankruptcies. In 2006, top executives at Goldman Sachs managers decided that many mortgage-backed securities were too risky and likely to default.
What did Goldman do to reduce its potential losses?
Goldman implemented an ingenious strategy to hedge against potential losses. Beginning in 2004 and continuing through 2008, traders at Goldman created 25 mortgage securities deals called Abacus, worth in total around $11 billion. But some of these financial instruments—particularly one of them designated ABACUS 2007-AC1—did not actually consist of groups of mortgages. These were called synthetic CDOs. According to both the NY Times and Bloomberg they comprised financial derivatives called credit-default swaps (CDS). It’s the way the CDS work and what Goldman did with them that are so fascinating.
What are credit-default swaps and what havoc did they cause?
CDS are a form of insurance purchased by an investor to protect against losses related to a loan or debt-related investment, such as a mortgage-backed security. The issuer of the CDS (usually a large company like a bank, an investment house, a mutual fund, or an insurance company) contracts to pay the investor if the security loses value or fails. The name CDS means in return for premium payments, the issuer insures the investor (who is a provider of credit) against default by the borrower by agreeing to pay if the investor loses the value or income of the debt-related investment.
In the midst of the housing bubble, when home prices were skyrocketing, issuers of CDS thought they were wonderful for making big profits. Few expected many homeowners to default on mortgages, because if they got into trouble, most homeowners could sell to buyers and realize gains.
But that changed when the bubble burst and housing prices fell. Homeowners having trouble making payments had no one to sell to, so many stopped paying the mortgages. Issuers of CDS lost lots of money due to having to pay off. Some of these unfortunate payers included the insurance company AIG and probably also the investment houses Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, which got bailed out by the government, went bankrupt or were forced to merge.
What was Goldman’s ingenious solution to its problem?
Like other investment houses that owned securities based on risky mortgages, Goldman was at risk of huge losses. Their way out was to make use of the fact that synthetic CDOs comprised of CDS could be sold as equivalents to regular CDOs.
At the time Goldman began to implement the strategy, the housing market was still bubbling away, and many investors were clamoring for more high-return mortgage-backed CDOs. Indeed, there weren’t enough of them to satisfy the demand. Moreover, investors continued to believe that CDS issuers faced little risk of having to pay off. Since holders of CDS could earn a good return in the form of premiums on the insurance they provided to the holders of CDOs, and since investors believed that the CDOs wouldn’t fail, many were willing to buy synthetic CDOs comprised of bundled CDS, in lieu of buying regular CDOs.
In that environment, traders at Goldman created the Abacus securities, apparently as substitutes for CDOs and sold them to investors. But instead of issuing the CDS in line with the usual practice, Goldman reversed the procedure and packaged the CDS into synthetic CDOs in Abacus. In this arrangement, apparently, Goldman was the insured party and the investors would have to pay off to Goldman if the CDOs lost value, as they did in the following years. According to Bloomberg:
Abacus deals were filled with default swaps that offered payouts to Goldman Sachs if certain mortgage bonds didn’t pay as promised, in return for regular premiums from the bank.
This morning the NY Times made this similar point:
Their Abacus deals included insurancelike protection that would pay out if certain mortgage bonds soured. Such credit-default swaps were not worth much in 2005, when housing was flying high, but became highly valuable once the market sputtered.
Goldman’s activity seems reprehensible. The investors who dealt with Goldman expected to be sold securities in an ethical manner. Instead, it appears that Goldman used its investors to escape from its financial problems. It used them to insure its own potential losses in the housing market. Again, however, I emphasize that I’m no expert in these matters. This is just how it seems to me.
In testimony before the Congressionally-created Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein pointed out that it dealt with the most sophisticated investors. That seems to be true. Here are a couple of links describing the financial drubbing taken by Goldman’s trading partners and counterparties, like AIG.
Even the experts can sometimes be gullible fools.